A Critique on the Solution of Zakzewoski’s Virtue Responsibilism to the Gettier Problem
A Critique on the Solution of Zakzewoski’s Virtue Responsibilism to the Gettier Problem
Religion and Social Communication Vol. 24, No. 1 (2026)
ISSN 3057-0883 (Online)
Author
Liu Caiqin
Department of Literature and Journalism,
Guangdong Ocean University, Zhanjiang, Guangdong, China
Email: liucaiqin@gdou.edu.cn
ORCID: 0009-0002-8787-6234
Abstract
Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as a justified true belief) is insufficient. Some philosophers have proposed that virtue epistemology holds the key to solving the Gettier problem. Among them, Zagzebski’s virtue responsibilism has gained significant popularity. This solution posits that knowledge is a belief state originating from acts of intellectual virtue, where these acts are driven by intellectually virtuous motivations, the cognizer successfully achieves the ultimate goal of motivation (truth and understanding) through these acts. In other words, knowledge (truth) is attained because of the operation of one’s intellectual virtues. This revision of the traditional analysis of knowledge purportedly escapes the problems identified in the Gettier cases. In this paper, I argue that Zagzebski’s definition of knowledge is problematic as it cannot be proven that intellectual virtue is a necessary condition for knowledge. Furthermore, in the metaphysical context of mind–things dualism, it is unrealistic to attempt to establish a stable and reliable connection between intellectual virtue (the mind) and truth (the external world). In short, the intellectual virtue of epistemic agent cannot guarantee the acquisition of knowledge. It is not the key to solving the Gettier problem.
Keywords
Gettier problem, Zagzebski, virtue responsibilism, virtue epistemology, intellectual virtue, cognitive character
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Pages: 35–53
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62461/CQL181026
Submitted, Accepted & Published Dates
Submitted: July 30, 2025
Accepted: October 18, 2025
Published: January 10, 2026
Cite this article
Liu, Caiqin. “A Critique on the Solution of Zakzewoski’s Virtue Responsibilism to the Gettier Problem.” Religion and Social Communication 24, no. 1 (2026): 35–53. https://doi.org/10.62461/CQL181026.
Copyright & License
© 2026 The authors. This is an open access article under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).